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ECOLABEL PROGRAMS AND GREEN 
CONSUMERISM: PRESERVING A HYBRID 
APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Since environmental law emerged as a method for regulating industry 
pollution, command and control technology-based standards have been the 
dominant government strategy and the dominant recipients of academic 
criticism.1 To alleviate the inefficiencies of technology-based standards, 
critics advocated for changing the method used to set standards,2 as well as 
for complete alternatives such as market-based and information-based 
design schemes.3 Others believed that “the use of multiple instruments will 
tend to be the rule rather than the exception” for setting broad 
environmental laws.4 Modern government environmental programs often 
intertwine regulatory standards with ecolabel programs,5 but whether such 
intervention has eradicated the problems of technology-based standards is 
questionable.6 
Ecolabel programs substantiated by third-party certification exemplify a 
hybrid form of environmental law, using standards, incentives, and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart]; Rena I. Steinzor, 
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 
22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 112 (1998); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-
Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2000). Command and control regulations 
“require or proscribe specific conduct by regulated firms.” Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, 
Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1264 
(1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Conceptual Framework]. 
 2. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 
21, 38–40 (2001) [hereinafter Stewart, New Generation]. 
 3. Id. at 94–99, 127–29. 
 4. Robert W. Hahn, The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a 
Unifying Framework, 65 PUB. CHOICE 21, 36 (Apr. 1990). See also Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified 
Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 150 n.5 (1993) 
(“Incentive-based, market-driven means of accomplishing environmental goals can serve as 
valuable supplements to traditional command-and-control regulatory programs.”). 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED INITIATIVES BY STATE (2010) [hereinafter 
LEED INITIATIVES BY STATE], available at https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID 
=7924 (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification for buildings 
implemented by federal, state, and local governments); AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., USDA, NATIONAL 
ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL ORGANIC 
PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION], available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile 
?dDocName=STELDEV3004443 (the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Organic food 
labeling program); ENERGY STAR, THE ENERGY STAR® LABEL: A SUMMARY OF PRODUCT 
LABELING OBJECTIVES AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES2 (2003), available at http://www.energystar 
.gov/ia/partners/prod_development/downloads/guiding_princip.pdf. (ENERGY STAR appliance 
labeling program). 
 6. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Organic program suffers from inadequate 
enforcement. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USDA, AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY 1, 1–4, 
OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM (Mar. 2010). 
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information to implement change.7 An ecolabel is “[a] visual 
communication tool indicating environmentally preferable products, 
services or companies that are based on standards or criteria.”8 Ecolabel 
regulations, as a form of information-based government intervention, work 
best “when the label’s meaning is well understood by consumers and 
reflects their preferences.”9 When the ecolabel program is implemented 
prematurely, ahead of the consumer learning curve, such initiative to inform 
consumers about a product’s environmental benefits with a simple label 
results in insufficient disclosure of a product’s environmental attributes.10 
Paradoxically, the shorthand endorsement of attributes precludes the 
consumer from making informed choices.11 Additionally, unsubstantiated 
and unverified environmental claims could lead to consumer deception and 
mistrust of the ecolabel.12 
As consumers have become more interested in purchasing sustainable 
products, academics, politicians, and even industries have stressed a need to 
mitigate issues of consumer confusion and mistrust and have advocated for 
government regulation and uniformity of ecolabel programs, standards, and 
environmental claims.13 Meanwhile, government agencies have taken an 
active role in implementing and incentivizing ecolabel programs that 
require third-party certification, or compliance with such certification,14 so 
that the consumer has “assurance that a product, process or service 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See, e.g., Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 97, 136.  
 8. Greener Products Glossary, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/greenerproducts/glossary/index 
.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2012). 
 9. David Conner & Ralph Christy, The Organic Label: How to Reconcile its Meaning with 
Consumer Preferences, 35 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RES. 40, 40 (2004). 
 10. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 139. “One of the primary limitations in 
environmental labeling programs . . . has been a lack of consumer awareness or interest in eco-
labels and the information they seek to provide.” Id. 
 11. See Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (1995). 
 12. Roger D. Wynne, The Emperor’s New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific 
Certification Systems Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal Certification Mark 
Program, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54 (1994) (describing the current “green consumer market” as 
“dysfunctional” because of unsubstantiated claims, deceptive fact-skewing, and resulting 
consumer cynicism). 
 13. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 11, at 1462–63 (advocating for a market-oriented approach 
due to the inadequacy of eco-information alone). The eco-information program could be reformed 
with the federal government acting as the central authority and the state and local governments 
implementing the regulations. Menell, supra note 11, at 1463, 1470, 1472. See also Lauren C. 
Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation, 14 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 685 (2006); Jessica E. Fliegelman, Note, The Next Generation of Greenwash: 
Diminishing Consumer Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1001 (2010); Greg Northen, Comment, Greenwashing the Organic Label: Abusive 
Green Marketing in an Increasingly Eco-Friendly Marketplace, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 101 
(2011); Robert B. White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Federal 
Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Avi Gesser, Comment, Canada’s Environmental Choice Program: A Model for a 
“Trade-friendly” Eco-Labeling Scheme, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 501, 501 (1998). 
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conforms to specified requirements.”15 However, this movement for 
uniformity could threaten the hybrid balance of the ecolabel form of 
environmental regulation, resulting in a return to, rather than an evolution 
from, the themes of traditional command and control regulation so 
vehemently opposed today. 
This note will present three examples of well-developed organizations 
that have implemented third-party certification ecolabel programs that have 
received widespread acceptance within their industry. They exemplify how 
government-administered or government-encouraged ecolabel programs 
have limits to their effectiveness. Consumer misconceptions about what 
these ecolabel programs actually represent persist, and the programs do not 
necessarily encourage anything more than a discrete traditional standard. 
These approaches dampen the effectiveness of a hybrid form of 
environmental regulation, and have resulted in ecolabel programs with 
third-party certification suffering from many of the same problems of 
command and control technology-based standards. 
Part I provides an overview of technology-based standard setting and its 
shortcomings as an environmental regulation, and compares it with market-
based alternatives. Part II explains the background of the environmental 
consumerism movement. As consumers demanded eco-friendly products 
and the industry responded by producing products claiming to be eco-
friendly, various stakeholders—including non-governmental organizations, 
federal agencies, and state governments—contemplated methods for 
protecting consumers from unsubstantiated environmental claims. Part III 
evaluates three mainstream ecolabel programs in the United States: United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Organic for agricultural 
products, ENERGY STAR for appliances, and Leadership in Energy & 
Environmental Design (LEED) for buildings. After an overview of the 
program, each ecolabel will be evaluated based on how consumers 
comprehend the ecolabel and whether the ecolabel program suffers from 
regulatory issues rooted in traditional command and control environmental 
theory. Finally, Part IV concludes by advocating for hybrid regulatory 
controls as effective strategies in promoting consumer comprehension. 
I. THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: FROM 
COMMAND AND CONTROL TO MARKET-BASED 
SOLUTIONS 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government enacted a series of 
environmental regulations targeting pollution.16 As a result, “every 
discharge into the land, water or air . . . requires direct or indirect 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Greener Products Glossary, supra note 8.  
 16. E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of 
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 317 (1985). 
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permission from the national government.”17 The federal government has 
preferred to use standards as opposed to screening because it capitalizes on 
economies of scale, maintains the control of a centralized decision-making 
authority (as opposed to delegating to state and local governments), and 
“avoid[s] competitive or regional disruption.”18 Environmental economists 
generally focus on correcting externalities at the manufacture or 
development level, so that product prices accurately represent environ-
mental harm.19 
Criticism of these environmental tools led academics to consider the 
next evolution in environmental regulation.20 They argued that 
environmental law should shift to a system that involved the public in 
answering whether current regulations are too ambitious, too lax, or just 
right,21 and implement a strategy focused at the consumer level to improve 
environmental quality sufficiently.22 Ecolabel programs have emerged as a 
solution because they assist consumers in directly addressing environmental 
externalities and in making informed purchases.23 And though 
environmentalists tend to prefer the current standards-based approach while 
industries usually want market-based environmental controls,24 ecolabel 
programs combine the advantages of both regulatory tools.25 
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY-
BASED STANDARD SETTING 
As command and control regulations mandate certain actions,26 the 
government may implement the system through “standards” or “screening” 
techniques.27 Standards are requirements “uniformly applied to an entire 
category of products or processes,” whereas screening makes individual, 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. Water and air pollution are regulated by technology standards based on best available 
technology. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1334–35. See also Wagner, supra note 1, at 85 
n.7.  
 18. Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1266. For products, uniformity helps 
industries and enforcers benefit from economies of scale. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 618 (1996). Uniformity of process is desirable 
when “network effects are significant,” meaning that a jurisdiction benefits by adopting a 
previously developed policy design, even if not perfectly tailored to the jurisdiction, to avoid 
substantial costs of developing one itself. Id. at 619 (internal quotation marks omitted). Industries 
supported national rules because they were viewed as a lesser evil than having to deal with infinite 
state and local government strategies. Elliott et al., supra note 16, at 333.  
 19. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 94.  
 20. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1334.  
 21. Id. at 1353.  
 22. See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD 147–48 (2008). 
 23. Menell, supra note 11, at 1444.  
 24. Hahn, supra note 4, at 30.  
 25. Gesser, supra note 14, at 504, 512.  
 26. See generally Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1.  
 27. Id. at 1265.  
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case-by-case, decisions.28 Technology-based standards, also known as 
design standards, are set after the government assesses industry practices, 
the current equipment available to control pollution, and the realistic 
effectiveness of such equipment.29 By taking inventory of what methods are 
possible, the government then sets pollution limits for industry classes that 
correlate to the individual businesses using such technology.30 
The main advantages of technology-based standards are consistent and 
predictable results, reduced implementation costs, and transparent decision 
making.31 Because of the uncertainty in human-caused environmental 
impact, technology standards remain “one of the most reliable methods for 
controlling pollution.”32 A central regulation scheme, as compared to 
individual decision making, enables “broad-based scientific activities” and 
“collectively derived best approximations about environmental harms.”33 
There is no need to prove the harm associated with the pollution, reducing 
the burden of establishing causation.34 Standards also address pollution with 
technology solutions rather than “switching to inherently less polluting 
[sources].”35 With standards, environmental protection is of paramount 
importance in setting regulations.36 
Despite the numerous advantages, technology-based standards have 
borne the brunt of command and control environmental regulation 
criticism,37 particularly for economic inefficiency and agency failure.38 The 
requirements apply uniformly to a specific group, even though the 
ecological conditions, human effects, and opportunity costs may vary 
widely within each class or category.39 “[D]iffering control capabilities and 
cost functions of particular polluters” are of no concern.40 Additionally, new 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. See also Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and Fine-Tuning Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1269 n.8 
(1985) (noting standards are set by “different categories or classes of industries”). 
 29. See Wagner, supra note 1, at 88–89. Other standards are based on harm levels, costs and 
benefits, and performance. Id. at 87 n.14.  
 30. Id. at 88–89. Technology-based standards almost always set a numerical limit but often are 
misconstrued as always requiring a specific technology to actually be implemented. Id. at 90 n.26.  
 31. Latin, supra note 28, at 1271. Even if the program is expensive, it is still economically 
feasible. Id. at 1273.  
 32. Wagner, supra note 1.  
 33. Esty, supra note 18, at 578–80.  
 34. Latin, supra note 28, at 1303.  
 35. Elliott et al., supra note 16, at 333. 
 36. Latin, supra note 28, at 1268 n.6.  
 37. Steinzor, supra note 1, at 114. Health-based standards are preferable to technology-based 
standards, but obtaining the information necessary to set correct pollution levels to correlate with 
health effects is extremely difficult. Id. at 113–14.  
 38. Id. at 112.  
 39. Latin, supra note 28, at 1268 n.7.  
 40. Id. at 1269 n.8. See also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1335 (stating that uniform 
technology standards are wasteful because they do not assess individual costs or individual 
pollution effects). 
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sources are regulated more stringently than existing sources.41 This 
potentially discourages new players from entering the market.42 
Regulations can “foreclose innovation opportunities.”43 The agency’s 
snapshot assessment of available technology fails to encourage continuous 
innovation of environmental technology.44 An industry has no incentive to 
do any better than what the standard requires.45 Also, a “moving target” 
phenomenon occurs, whereby “uncertain, shifting targets . . . can chill 
innovation incentives among regulated firms”46 because industries have 
difficulty in predicting the standards about to be imposed upon them.47 
Within a single agency, setting standards may be separated from 
monitoring and enforcing responsibilities, and could hinder an effective 
bargaining process that fully considers intra-agency tradeoffs.48 The 
government has limited resources, is unable to fund effective monitoring, 
and must rely on industry self-reporting.49 Even when illegal acts are 
discovered, the sanctions imposed are ineffective deterrents.50 In summary, 
many critics feel that “technology-based standards have not met their 
potential.”51 
B. MARKET-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 
Through economic incentive programs, the government tries to 
establish its environmental goals by using economic instruments to set the 
correct price of a unit of environmental degradation,52 in contrast to 
command and control programs that attempt to set the correct quantity of 
total environmental degradation.53 Industries remain free to set their own 
internal quantity but are incentivized to lower their quantities of harm and 
to develop the most cost-effective means for complying with such limits.54 
A related field of environmental theory is “reflexive law,”55 which can 
supplement or work in conjunction with the existing regulatory schemes.56 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 4, at 27; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336.  
 42. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336.  
 43. Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1262. “Market innovation” relates to 
increasing market output per unit of input. Id. at 1261. “Social innovation” relates to developing 
new methods that promote public welfare. Id.  
 44. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1336.  
 45. Latin, supra note 28, at 1269 n.9.  
 46. Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 1272.  
 47. Id. at 1271.  
 48. Hahn, supra note 4, at 39.  
 49. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1344–45.  
 50. Id.  
 51. See Wagner, supra note 1, at 110–12 (viewing, optimistically, technology-based standards 
as having room for improvement).  
 52. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 96.  
 53. Id. at 94.  
 54. Id. at 95.  
 55. Id. at 127.  
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The objective of reflexive law is to “promote the internalization of 
environmental norms . . . as opposed to directly controlling . . . external 
conduct.”57 Like economic incentives, reflexive law continues to focus on 
industry conduct, not consumer conduct.58 
Problems with such programs include the ability to provide accurate 
data in a clear way to consumers, ability to obtain market data as to whether 
consumers will actually pay a premium, and reluctance to aggregate such 
consumer preferences to set national environmental goals.59 Thus, these 
programs have been described as “unsuitable candidates” for replacing 
command and control programs entirely, though could be “useful 
supplements” in the broad environmental regulatory scheme.60 
C. A HYBRID APPROACH: ECOLABEL STRATEGIES FOR 
CORRECTING ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES AND 
EMPOWERING CONSUMERS TO EXPRESS THEIR PURCHASE 
PREFERENCES 
In the United States, a main culprit of environmental harm is consumer 
behavior.61 Another market-driven method for mitigating environmental 
damage associated with consumption is through “green consumerism,” 
where consumers want to buy green products and businesses want to 
produce them.62 Green consumerism is one of the few environmental 
protection strategies that align the interests of environment and industry.63 
Ecolabel programs are a hybrid form of environmental regulation 
because they set uniform criteria for an entire class,64 like technology-based 
standards, but independent organizations develop their own methods for 
certifying environmental attributes.65 As an alternative to command and 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 129, 130.  
 57. Id. at 127.  
 58. Id. Ecolabel programs within this category inform consumers about a firm or product’s 
environmental performance so that the consumer purchases from them instead of from 
environmentally inferior performing firms or products. Id. at 97. The ecolabel indirectly imposes a 
tax on poorly performing environmental products because the businesses that make such products 
suffer from diminished sales. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 96–97.  
 61. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 147.  
 62. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 148; Grodsky, supra note 4, at 150; see also Ciannat M. 
Howett, Note, The “Green Labeling” Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of 
Environmental Product Claims, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 401, 403 (1992) (stating that “green” 
consumerism is a method to “increase the market for environmentally-sound products”). 
 63. See, e.g., Gesser, supra note 14, at 501 (“For producers, these labels are an opportunity to 
increase sales for certain products that meet the labeling requirements. From the 
environmentalist's perspective, the labels help preserve the environment by encouraging 
consumers to buy, and manufacturers to produce, products that are not harmful to the 
environment.”). Regarding environmental policy, industries are concerned about profit effects 
while environmentalists care about environmental effects. See Hahn, supra note 4, at 25.  
 64. Gesser, supra note 14, at 5004.  
 65. See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 136–37.  
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control, industries develop their own regulations, usually with public 
participation and government oversight.66 Whereas a market-based system 
relies on the price to reflect environmental externalities, information-based 
ecolabels describe environmental attributes about a product.67 Ecolabel 
programs and third-party certification let individuals express their 
willingness to pay for noneconomic benefits as private consumers,68 in 
contrast to technology-based rationales that force individuals to pay as 
public citizens.69 Informed individuals will also be better equipped to 
engage in civic action, which is crucial to the success of modern 
environmental activism.70 
Ecolabel programs rely on the theory that third-party certification self-
regulation will work because “an industry consensus will develop over time 
regarding the criteria for environmental seals.”71 Consumers identify the 
best products without requiring costly government monitoring and 
enforcement.72 The success of green consumerism, however, depends on 
accurate information regarding the environmental attributes of the 
product.73 
II. HISTORY OF GREEN CONSUMERISM AND THE 
“GREENWASHING” PHENOMENON 
As environmental effects of human activity became increasingly 
publicized, consumers recognized “that their individual and collective 
purchasing . . . decisions significantly affect the quality of the 
environment.”74 A surge of environmentally conscious consumers started to 
consider environmental effects when comparing products.75 Indeed, 
consumers wanted to buy green products and were willing to pay a 
premium for them.76 In response, businesses wanted to capitalize on the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Steinzor, supra note 1, at 104.  
 67. See Menell, supra note 11, at 1442–43.  
 68. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 141 (discussing how individuals make the 
decision to act). 
 69. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical: The 
Rationale for Technology-based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 741–42 (discussing non-
economic benefits of protecting workers and the environment). 
 70. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 221. A “New Democracy” supporting environmental change 
will rely on “direct democracy—citizens debating the options, learning together, overcoming their 
differences, and coming to decision. It is far away from today’s interest-group, representational 
democracy.” Id.  
 71. Fliegelman, supra note 13, at 1045. 
 72. See id. at 1046.  
 73. See SPETH, supra note 22, at 150.  
 74. Howett, supra note 62, at 401.  
 75. See, e.g., Howett, supra note 62, at 401–03; Scott Hume & Patricia Strnad, Consumers Go 
‘Green,’ ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 3 (publishing a consumer national survey showing 
that consumers were concerned enough about environmental effects that they were willing to 
change their buying habits by sacrificing convenience or paying more). 
 76. Grodsky, supra note 4, at 147, 149.  
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new interest in sustainable products and claim that they produced green 
products.77 Consumer interest in buying green products became “perhaps 
the most important marketing trend of the [1990s].”78 
However, manufacturers were unclear in substantiating their products’ 
environmental claims.79 Many green marketing terms had “no clear, 
uniform meaning.”80 Additionally, a product could advertise one 
environmental benefit even though there was tradeoff environmental 
harm.81 An energy-efficient light bulb could contain toxic chemicals.82 The 
American Heart Association’s initiative to label foods that were less bad 
than comparable foods regarding heart disease with a HeartGuide label 
caused controversy because unlabeled products in another food category 
would likely be healthier.83 The legitimacy of such green product claims 
varied considerably, which “led to consumer confusion and mistrust of 
environmental claims in general.”84 
Because of the consumer mistrust of manufacturer claims forming, the 
success of green consumerism faced formidable challenges: consumers 
were less experienced in evaluating the validity of environmental claims 
themselves,85 and such frustration over confusing marketing claims could 
hinder the consumer’s pursuit of eco-friendly products.86 “Information 
strategies rely entirely on stakeholders to act upon the information.”87 Yet, 
as James Gustave Speth stated in The Bridge at the Edge of the World, it 
would be “foolhardy to count on major [environmental] change from the 
voluntary consumer choices of individuals.”88 Some level of government 
regulation is necessary.89 In the early 1990s, the idea that green 
consumerism desperately needed a set of uniform guidelines gained wide 
support.90 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See, e.g., Roger D. Wynne, Defining “Green”: Toward Regulation of Environmental 
Marketing Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 786–87 (1991); Howett, supra note 62, at 401–
02. For example, 26 percent of all new household items introduced in 1990 claimed to have some 
sort of environmental benefit. Id. at 402.  
 78. CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., FLA. ATTORNEY GEN., MASS. ATTORNEY GEN., MINN. ATTORNEY 
GEN., MO. ATTORNEY GEN., N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., TEX. ATTORNEY GEN., UTAH ATTORNEY 
GEN., WASH. ATTORNEY GEN. & WIS. ATTORNEY GEN., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND 
PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 12 (1990) 
[hereinafter THE GREEN REPORT]. 
 79. Id. at 13.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Grodsky, supra note 4, at 150–51 (stating that “the advertised environmental benefits of 
products are often undercut by undisclosed environmental harms”). 
 82. Id. at 151.  
 83. Id. at 210 (citations omitted). 
 84. Howett, supra note 62, at 402.  
 85. See, e.g., Grodsky, supra note 4, at 150.  
 86. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 19.  
 87. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 136.  
 88. SPETH, supra note 22, at 156.  
 89. Id. at 150.  
 90. See, e.g., THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 19.  
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A. PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM UNSUBSTANTIATED 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT CLAIMS WITH MARKETING 
GUIDELINES 
The “greenwashing” phenomenon led federal agencies, state 
governments, and industry leaders to strategize about how best to regulate 
environmental product claims and protect green consumerism.91 In 1990, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and ten states’ Attorneys General (collectively, the 
Task Force), came together to discuss the recent influx of environmental 
marketing claims and develop solutions for ensuring that consumers were 
protected from deceptive advertisement.92 The Task Force determined that 
the federal government was the appropriate source of regulation and “is 
preferable to industry self-regulation” because of the broad range of product 
categories and because the federal government is responsible for reducing 
environmental harm.93 Recommendations for federal action included 
creating national environmental marketing terminology and testing 
protocol.94 
National uniform guidelines do exist.95 In 1992, the FTC published a set 
of guidelines “[t]o help marketers make truthful and substantiated 
environmental claims.”96 Its Green Guides publication is not enforceable as 
law, but is a useful resource for private industries and businesses seeking to 
avoid consumer deception regarding environmental advertisement.97 
Additionally, private firms published marketing guides for consumers and 
industries.98 TerraChoice, a “sustainable marketing and consulting” firm,99 
describes the seven types of “Sins” that a manufacturer may employ when 
advertising the environmental attributes of a product.100 The sins include 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 2.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 20–24.  
 94. Id. at 20–21.  
 95. The FTC publishes its Green Guides to “help marketers avoid making green claims that 
are ‘unfair or deceptive’ in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.” It’s Too Easy Being Green: 
Defining Fair Green Marketing Principles: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, 
and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2009) 
(statement of James Kohm, Assoc. Dir., Enforcement Div., FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov 
/os/2009/06/P954501greenmarketing.pdf. 
 96. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 63,552 
(proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). 
 97. Federal Trade Commission Proposes Revised “Green Guides,” FTC (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/10/greenguide.shtm. 
 98. E.g., TERRACHOICE GROUP, THE SINS OF GREENWASHING (2010), available at http: 
//sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2010/. 
 99. Mission and History, UL TERRACHOICE, http://terrachoice.com/about/mission-history/ 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 100. THE SINS OF GREENWASHING, supra note 98, at 10.  
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“hidden trade-off,” “no proof,” “vagueness,” “irrelevance,” “lesser of two 
evils,” “fibbing,” and “worshiping false labels.”101 
The Task Force recognized that national standards and environmental 
certification programs shared the same goal of improving consumer 
information.102 Because of the need for distinct uniform guidelines, the 
Task Force advised that certification and seal of approval programs were 
well-suited to coexist, rather than merge, with a federal regulatory 
program.103 
B. ECOLABELS AND THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION SOLUTIONS FOR 
SUBSTANTIATING GREEN MARKETING CLAIMS 
Third-party certification and seal of approval programs emerged.104 In 
1991, there were about fifty ecolabels launched that year.105 In 2011, there 
were over 350 total ecolabel programs.106 With ecolabels, “[t]he concept is 
simple—to reduce an evaluation of a product or process into a simple, 
environmentally beneficial sign.”107 Ecolabels are considered “positive” 
information strategies.108 Environmental labeling educates the consumer 
about “the environmental and social impacts of the products and services 
they buy and use.”109 This empowers the consumer to make a conscious 
decision about her environmental preference.110 Additionally, 
manufacturers want to capitalize on the market advantage for incorporating 
environmental considerations into their products.111 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id.  
 102. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 26 (stating that government or industry should 
enforce clear standards that would “provide consumers with more information about the 
environmental consequences of their purchasing decisions”). 
 103. Id. at 26–27.  
 104. SPETH, supra note 22, at 150–51; CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, DUKE 
UNIVERSITY, AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 8 (Jay S. Golden ed., 2010), available at http://center.sustainability.duke 
.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ecolabelsreport.pdf. 
 105. Anastasia O’Rourke, Trends in Ecolabeling, CSRHUB, 4 (May 3, 2011) (webinar), 
http://www.csrhub.com/files/Sustainable_Industries_Webinar_2011.pdf. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 136.  
 108. Id. at 134. “Information strategies can take many forms in source, type, amount, 
complexity and audience. They can be negative, such as tobacco warning labels on cigarettes; 
neutral, as in required reporting under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); or 
positive, such as eco-labels that disclose the behavioral environmental characteristics of products.” 
Id.  
 109. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, ECO-LABELING STANDARDS, GREEN PROCUREMENT AND 
THE WTO: SIGNIFICANCE FOR WORLD BANK BORROWERS 1 (2005) [hereinafter ECO-LABELING 
STANDARDS], available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Ecolabeling_WTO_Mar05.pdf.  
 110. See id. at iii.  
 111. CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, supra note 104, at 10.  
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A single-attribute claim focuses on one environmental aspect whereas a 
multi-attribute claim evaluates several types of environmental indicators.112 
Whether the label indicates an environmental process or an environmental 
product has been “a focal point in environmental policy debates.”113 A 
process label evaluates how the product was made, whereas a product label 
indicates “observable or testable characteristics of the final product 
itself.”114 Information labels, which have been more effective than simple 
seal of approval logos, allow the consumer to compare environmental 
characteristics across products.115 
Governments and agencies have implemented their own combination of 
regulations, third-party certifications, and seal of approval programs.116 
Moreover, state and local governments are using ecolabels to indicate 
compliance with program requirements.117 Government regulation of 
certification and seal of approval programs ranges from requiring labels on 
certain products that inform the consumer about a specified environmental 
quality, to regulating the right of a product to indicate a certain attribute, to 
general advisement of voluntary programs administered by third parties.118 
The FTC continues to offer general guidelines for ecolabel programs.119 The 
FTC’s proposed Green Guides adds a new section called “Certifications 
and Seals of Approval,” but clarifies that claims by third-party programs are 
technically already covered under the “Endorsement Guides” section.120 
Significantly, the proposed changes to the guides “cautions marketers that 
unqualified seals of approval and certifications likely constitute general 
environmental benefit claims and, because marketers are unlikely to be able 
to substantiate such claims, they should not use unqualified certifications or 
seals of approval.”121 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Stephanie Vierra, Green Building Standards and Certification Systems, WHOLE BLDG. 
DESIGN GUIDE, http://www.wbdg.org/resources/gbs.php#ar (last updated Sept. 26, 2011) 
(referencing ISO 14000 Type I and Type II categories). 
 113. Michelle T. Friedland, You Call that Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food 
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 385 (2005). 
 114. Id. at 384.  
 115. DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, 
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: PROMOTING CLIMATE-FRIENDLY HOUSEHOLD 
CONSUMPTION PATTERNS ¶ 42 (2007) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND 
PRODUCTION], available at http://www.greeningtheblue.org/sites/default/files/Sustainable 
%20consumption%20&%20Production.pdf.  
 116. Some agencies, like the Department of Agriculture, have created a national definition of 
“organic” food, then established procedures for third-party certification of the process and labels 
for marking the food. NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 
5.  
 117. See Erin Elizabeth Burg Hupp, Refining Green Building Regulations and Funding Green 
Buildings in Order to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Reductions, 42 URB. LAW. 639, 641–42 (2010). 
 118. See ECO-LABELING STANDARDS, supra note 109, at 4–5.  
 119. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552 
(proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). 
 120. Id. at 63,564–68.  
 121. Id. at 63,566.  
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III. EVALUATION OF THREE WIDELY RECOGNIZED 
ECOLABELS IN THE UNITED STATES BASED ON 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND CONSUMER 
COMPREHENSION OF WHAT THE ECOLABEL ACTUALLY 
REPRESENTS ABOUT THE PRODUCT 
Ecolabels have been criticized for their proliferation in the United 
States—there are too many organizations and too many methodologies used 
in creating ecolabel criteria122 because each third-party organization tends to 
focus on the environmental attributes and impacts relevant to their own 
industry.123 Ecolabel programs “face issues of brand awareness, 
understanding and consumer trust,”124 and risk further exacerbating 
consumer confusion.125 “Because such programs generally involve an 
overall stamp of approval rather than a description of the specific 
environmental attributes of a product, they are necessarily based on 
complicated value judgments about what is best for the environment.”126 In 
doing so, the organization is making its own assumptions about the 
parameters a consumer needs, wants, and understands in order to evaluate 
an environmental claim.127 
Ecolabel programs also vary by the program administration, ranging 
from nonprofit organizations to government agencies.128 Government 
organizations only operate 15 percent of the total ecolabel programs.129 
Some critics of ecolabel programs suggest that the consumer confusion with 
ecolabel programs will be mitigated by uniformity in standards130 or by 
more government intervention at the federal level.131 One author states that 
“[c]learly defined national standards that have the effect of law are 
necessary to combat the problems associated with green marketing.”132 
Another author suggests that uniform national standards that preempt state 
and local governments will solve consumer confusion over green marketing 
claims.133 Yet, federally administered ecolabel programs still have issues of 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See Gesser, supra note 14, at 511–15; TERRACHOICE GROUP, supra note 98, at 19–20. 
 123. Gesser, supra note 14, at 514–15.  
 124. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 141. “Negative information strategies, which 
tend to be government mandated, are among the most effective. Neutral information strategies 
such as environmental impact assessments are used to confront broad, cross medium 
environmental concerns.” Id.  
 125. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 78, at 26–27.  
 126. Id. at 27.  
 127. See Grodsky, supra note 4, at 225–26 (stressing the importance of whether the parameters 
are effective indicators of environmental quality).  
 128. Gesser, supra note 14, at 505.  
 129. O’Rourke, supra note 105, at 7.  
 130. See, e.g., Northen, supra note 13. “Universal definitions and standards in the green 
marketplace” will hopefully mitigate greenwashing of organic food. Id. at 130.  
 131. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 11, at 1462–63; Fliegelman, supra note 13; White, supra note 
13, at 325–26 (describing federal regulation options to protect consumers from greenwashing). 
 132. Avallone, supra note 13, at 686.  
 133. White, supra note 13, at 348.  
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brand awareness and consumer communication that private organizations 
face.134 Moreover, federalized ecolabel programs suffer from similar 
disadvantages of traditional command and control standards.135 
This note will describe the level of government administration, the 
consumer miscomprehension associated with the ecolabel, and the 
disadvantages the program shares with command and control regulations 
for three ecolabel programs. The ecolabel programs evaluated are 
environmental labels awarded to products that meet criteria so that they 
earn a license to use the program seal or label.136 They also represent a 
range of sustainable product categories.137 USDA Organic, ENERGY 
STAR, and LEED Certified are industry-leading ecolabel programs that 
consumers recognize.138 
A. USDA ORGANIC: A FOOD LABEL CREATED AND ADMINISTERED 
BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
The USDA Organic label identifies a food or agricultural product that 
has been produced in compliance with “cultural, biological, and mechanical 
practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, and 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, CLIMATE PROT. DIV., EPA, NATIONAL 
AWARENESS OF ENERGY STAR FOR 2009: ANALYSIS OF 2009 CEE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 7–8 
(2010), available at http://www.cee1.org/eval/2009_ES_survey.pdf; Jason J. Czarnezki, The 
Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle 
Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 34 (2011) (noting that consumers “may identify ‘organic’ with 
. . . . characteristics . . . often not true of many organic foods”). 
 135. Sean Rosner, Energy Star Criteria Now Tougher, MOTHER EARTH NEWS, Aug.–Sept. 
2010, at 22. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-470, ENERGY STAR 
PROGRAM: COVERT TESTING SHOWS THE ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS 
VULNERABLE TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 1–3 (2010). 
 136. Gesser, supra note 14, at 503–04.  
 137. The sample of product categories includes food and agriculture, electrical products, and 
buildings (LEED). Product categories are taken from Inhabitat website. Lea Bogdan, ECO 
LABELS 101: Green Certifications Explained!, INHABITAT (Apr. 6, 2010, 2:00 PM), 
http://inhabitat.com/demystifying-eco-labels/print. 
 138. In 2008, the green building industry accounted for about 33 percent to 42 percent of dollars 
spent in the building market and is expected to be 62 percent to 75 percent in 2013. GREENGUARD 
ENVTL. INST., PRIMARY GREEN PRODUCT STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS: A 
COMPARISON 1 (2009) (citations omitted), available at http://www.greenguard.org 
/Libraries/GG_Documents/Reformat_WP_GreenProdCertProgCompare_FINAL_1.sflb.ashx. 
LEED is used throughout the country and is one of “the most commonly used and respected green 
building rating and certification systems in the marketplace.” Vierra, supra note 112, at 3–4. 
ENERGY STAR (Energy Star) is one of the “primary market movers” of green building product 
labels. GREENGUARD ENVTL. INST., supra, at 1–2 (citing a McGraw-Hill Construction 2009 
SmartMarkets report). In 2008, awareness of Energy Star programs among the building industry 
was 83 percent, while Green Seal was 19 percent, FSC was 21 percent, and WaterSense was 14 
percent. GREENGUARD ENVTL. INST., supra, at 2. Within the general environmental product 
category, a 2009 EcoMarkets purchasing survey stated that Energy Star and USDA Organic were 
two of the ten most recognized eco-label names in the United States. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. 
MKTG., ECOMARKETS SUMMARY REPORT 23 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.terrachoice 
.com/files/EcoMarkets%202009%20Summary%20Report%20-%20Oct%202009.pdf. 
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conserve biodiversity.”139 Any agricultural product labeled as USDA 
Organic must comply with the specific USDA organic regulations,140 which 
focus on chemical-free food products and animal welfare.141 An agricultural 
product is “any agricultural commodity or product . . . that is marketed in 
the United States for human or livestock consumption,”142 and generally 
categorized as either crops or livestock.143 
The organic label is a positive information strategy144 and is process-
driven, meaning it focuses on the inputs of agricultural productions.145 The 
USDA Organic ecolabel program does not guarantee that the product is free 
from pesticides or chemicals,146 nor does it certify the overall agricultural 
land use process.147 Notably, the label does not represent nutritional or 
food-safety benefits.148 Among banned practices are the uses of “[s]ynthetic 
fertilizers, sewage sludge, irradiation, and genetic engineering;”149 these 
production methods were widely opposed during the promulgation of the 
rules.150  
Organic livestock labeling requires additional procedures.151 For 
example, the production standards prohibit using growth hormones.152 In 
addition, animal welfare standards specify that the producer implement a 
procedure that “accommodates the health and natural behavior of 
animals.”153 
                                                                                                                 
 139. National Organic Program, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., USDA, http://www.ams.usda.gov 
/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateC&navID=NationalOrganicProgram 
&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPConsumers&description=Consumers&acct 
=nopgeninfo (last modified Aug. 7, 2012). 
 140. Organic Standards, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., USDA, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0 
/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navID=OrganicStandardsLinkNOPOrganicSta
ndards&rightNav1=OrganicStandardsLinkNOPOrganicStandards&topNav=&leftNav=&page=N
OPOrganicStandards&resultType=&acct=nopgeninfo (last modified Aug. 14, 2012). 
 141. Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 15. 
 142. National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2010). 
 143. See id. (defining “crop” and “livestock”). Livestock includes “cattle, sheep, goats, swine, 
poultry, . . . equine animals . . . [, and] game,” but excludes aquatic animals and bees. Id. See also 
Organic Standards, supra note 140.  
 144. Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for Sustainable 
Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 634 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 145. Mikael Klintman, Ambiguous Framings of Political Consumerism: Means or End, Product 
or Process Orientation?, 30 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 427, 432 (2006); Pollans, supra note 144, 
at 641.  
 146. Friedland, supra note 113, at 384–85. The National Organic Program (NOP) is supposed to 
require organic certifying agents to conduct periodic testing for pesticide residue. OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 2–3.  
 147. Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 15.  
 148. NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 5.  
 149. National Organic Program, supra note 139.  
 150. Conner & Christy, supra note 9. The NOP initially tried to qualify “genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), biosolids, and irradiation” as permitted organic methods of production, but 
ultimately banned them in the promulgated rule. Id. 
 151. See generally National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.236–205.239 (2010). 
 152. Id. § 205.237(b)(1).  
 153. Id. § 205.239(a).  
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In its infancy, “organic agriculture began . . . on a very small scale” 
with a “dedicated group of semi-idealist[]” farmers.154 Then Congress 
passed the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, which required the 
USDA to promulgate uniform standards for foods labeled as “organic.”155 
The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Services created the National Organic 
Program (NOP) to administer the program, from developing standards to 
establishing the organic certification program.156 The NOP regulations 
address organic production, identification, certification, and accreditation 
standards for agricultural products.157 
After the federal government intervened, organic food labeling 
transformed “from a more complex and diverse system to a nationally 
standardized” labeling program.158 As of 2008, organic products accounted 
for “over 3 percent of total U.S. food sales.”159 In 2008, produce comprised 
37 percent of total organic sales, with dairy the next top seller at 16 percent, 
while organic meat, fish, and poultry accounted for only 3 percent of 
organic sales.160 The organic label has been criticized for assuming that a 
food labeling system for organic foods is a simple process, “as if organic 
foods were something absolute,” and that developing uniform national 
standards will enable green consumerism to flourish.161 
1. Consumer Comprehension and Misconception 
Consumers misunderstand the label’s meaning and function.162 Many 
believe the organic label means that the product is free from residual 
amounts of banned products that unintentionally contaminated the product, 
that buying organic products supports small farms, that organic farms are 
local farms, or that organic livestock promotes animal welfare.163 
Consumers of organic products justify their willingness to pay for the 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Klintman, supra note 145, at 431.  
 155. NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 5.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. (explaining crop standards and livestock standards, grouped separately).  
 158. Klintman, supra note 145, at 431.  
 159. Organic Agriculture: Organic Market Overview, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic 
-market-overview.aspx (last updated June 19, 2012) (citations omitted). 
 160. Id. “Produce accounted for 37 percent of U.S. organic food sales in 2008, followed by 
dairy (16 percent), beverages (13 percent), packaged and prepared foods (13 percent), bread and 
grains (10 percent), snack foods (5 percent), meat, fish, and poultry (3 percent), and condiments (3 
percent).” Id.  
 161. Klintman, supra note 145, at 427–28.  
 162. Conner & Christy, supra note 9.  
 163. Kate L. Harrison, Comment, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic 
Standards, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 221–27 (2008). See also id. at 233 (recommending an 
“Organic Plus” label for products “tested GMO and pesticide residue free,” “produced without the 
use of mined additives,” “produced on a small family farm,” “locally produced,” and “pasture 
raised”).  
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organic products with reasons of “support for sustainable agriculture and 
local food systems, and opposition to the ‘corporate’ food system.”164 
Organic farming and sustainable farming are not necessarily equivalent 
practices.165 A sustainable ecolabel would likely indicate the food’s carbon 
footprint, waste, natural resource impact from water consumption and land 
use, and health attributes.166 Organic farming may cause environmental 
tradeoffs because the energy savings from nonuse of chemicals is often 
offset by an energy increase in cultivating and harvesting, as organic crop 
yields per acre tend to be less than conventional farming practices.167 
Likewise, organic farming is not reserved for noncorporate small 
businesses.168 Some of the largest food company brand names, like Coca-
Cola, Dole, General Mills, H.J. Heinz, Kellogg, Mars, Kraft, Sara Lee, and 
Tyson Foods, have directly or indirectly acquired organic food lines.169 
Consumer confusion also arises over the level of animal welfare that the 
organic label indicates. Livestock must have access to outdoor space year-
round, but this standard has been interpreted as only requiring an 
“opportunity to exit” and does not “mandate that an entire herd or flock 
have access to the outdoors at any one time.”170 In addition, the regulations 
distinguish between grazing (ruminant) animals and non-grazing (poultry) 
animals.171 Ruminant livestock must be allowed to graze for sustenance on 
pastures for at least 1/3 of the year.172 Organic poultry seems to withstand 
the worst of this distinction’s burden, because some certifiers have abused 
the temporary confinement loophole to confine birds.173 
2. Similar Problems Between the Ecolabel and Certification 
Program and Technology-Based Standards 
The biggest problem with the USDA Organic label is its inconsistent 
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.174 The USDA Agricultural 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Conner & Christy, supra note 9, at 42.  
 165. Pollans, supra note 144, at 640–41; see also Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 31.  
 166. Czarnezki, supra note 134, at 31 (advocating for a new ecolabel that evaluates the food 
product comprehensively for its lifecycle and for multiple attributes).  
 167. SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION, supra note 115, at 23.  
 168. Friedland, supra note 113, at 409.  
 169. Id. “As of 2003, five extremely large farms controlled half of California’s $400 million 
organic produce market.” Id.  
 170. NAT’L ORGANIC PROGRAM, USDA, POLICY MEMO 11-5, ACCESS TO THE OUTDOORS FOR 
LIVESTOCK (2011), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName 
=STELPRDC5088950. 
 171. National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.239 (2010). 
 172. Id. §§ 205.237, 205.239(a).  
 173. See Sheila Rodriguez, The Morally Informed Consumer: Examining Animal Welfare 
Claims on Egg Labels, 30 TEMP J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 73 (2011). 
 174. E.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6; Gabriel Nelson, USDA’s Organic 
Enforcement Let Offenders Slide, Audit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes 
.com/gwire/2010/03/19/19greenwire-usdas-organic-enforcers-let-offenders-slide-au-
12233.html?pagewanted=print. 
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Marketing Service administers the NOP ecolabel program.175 The NOP is 
supposed “to assure consumers that organic products meet uniform 
standards and that they are appropriately labeled.”176 This is a daunting task 
for a program that had a staff of sixteen and a budget of about four million 
dollars in 2009.177 NOP’s resources are insufficient to monitor 30,000 
certified farms and facilities and 100 accredited certifiers.178 Between 2006 
and 2008, the USDA notified the NOP about five products in violation of 
the USDA Organic label criteria;179 it took the NOP an average of fifteen 
months to respond to each violation.180 
In 2010, the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) published the 
findings of its NOP audit.181 It found that despite the Organic Food 
Production Act of 1990 requiring certified agents to “conduct periodic 
residue testing of organic products,” the NOP regulations purposely omitted 
such obligations because of costs and “complex issues.”182 The OIG audited 
four USDA-accredited certifying agents responsible for certifying over 
5,000 farms and found that not a single farm was tested periodically for 
residue.183 Additionally, due to budget and logistic constraints, the NOP 
failed to follow its own requirements for evaluating its internal performance 
in every year except for its inception year.184 
B. ENERGY STAR: AN APPLIANCE LABEL CREATED AND 
ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
The EPA and Department of Energy (DOE) share joint responsibility in 
administering the ENERGY STAR (Energy Star) ecolabel program.185 The 
purpose of the Energy Star label program is to reduce air pollution resulting 
                                                                                                                 
 175. National Organic Program Background Information, supra note 5.  
 176. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 1.  
 177. See id. at 39 (noting that the NOP hoped to increase both its staff size and budget); Nelson, 
supra note 174.  




fication&description=Accreditation%20and%20Certification&acct=nopgeninfo (last modified 
Apr. 17, 2012). 
 179. Nelson, supra note 174.  
 180. Id.  
 181. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 32. This audit was conducted between 2008 
and 2009. Id.  
 182. Id. at 2–3 (internal citations omitted).  
 183. Id. at 2, 7.  
 184. Id. at 18. In 2004, the American National Standards Institute reviewed the NOP and found 
that it “lacked documented policies and procedures for managing the accreditation of certifying 
agents.” Id.  
 185. Geoffrey M. White et al., Green Building Rating Systems and Green Leases, in THE LAW 
OF GREEN BUILDINGS 15, 27 (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard eds., 2010). 
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from inefficient energy consumption and to help consumers identify the 
products that are superior in energy efficiency performance.186 Home 
appliances and products identified as Energy Star products have complied 
with energy efficiency and energy savings criteria.187 
The Energy Star program generally promotes a single environmental 
characteristic—energy efficiency—and does not indicate overall positive 
environmental performance.188 Within the Appliance category, the EPA sets 
ecolabel criteria for dehumidifiers and room air cleaners.189 The DOE 
regulates clothes washers, dishwashers, refrigerators and freezers, and room 
air conditioners; furthermore, these product categories must comply with 
additional federal standards.190 The Energy Star ecolabel was intended to 
identify the top 25 percent most efficient products within a particular 
category; thus, it is most useful when there is a variance in energy usage 
among product models.191 Once too many models meet the requirements, 
the agency will need to revise the specifications again so that it perpetually 
stays ahead of the market.192 
Congress created the Energy Star program as part of the Clean Air Act, 
federal legislation that strives to reduce air pollution.193 Additionally, 
section 131 of the Energy Policy Act mandates that the EPA and DOE 
promote Energy Star labeled products in the marketplace.194 These federal 
laws basically preempt states from setting more stringent appliance 
standards than the Energy Star program requires.195 
With the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, federal agencies 
must purchase certain energy efficient equipment, of which Energy Star 
                                                                                                                 
 186. ENERGY STAR, supra note 5, at 2.  
 187. White et al., supra note 185.  
 188. Stewart, New Generation, supra note 2, at 137.  
 189. EPA, MAINTAINING THE VALUE OF ENERGY STAR 10 (2007). 
 190. Id. at 10–11 tbl.1. For example, an Energy Star labeled refrigerator should exceed federal 
minimum energy efficiency requirements by 20 percent or more. Promoting Energy Star Qualified 
Refrigerators, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/manuf_res/salestraining_res 
/Refrigerator_Sell_Sheet.pdf (last updated Sept. 2010). 
 191. ENERGY STAR, supra note 5, at 10 (“If all product models used approximately equal 
amounts of energy, then an ENERGY STAR specification would not be pragmatic . . . .”). 
 192. See id. at 11.  
Once an ENERGY STAR specification is in place for some amount of time, market 
conditions and the available model mix may change, resulting in a majority of models 
meeting the specification. Thus, the label would no longer serve as a differentiator. This 
scenario dictates that EPA and DOE reassess the specification and potentially revise it, 
so that the label again serves to identify the most efficient models.  
Id.  
 193. See EPA, supra note 189, at 6.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited: Federalism, 
Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 335, 346 
(2010). 
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labeled products qualify.196 Because manufacturers are strongly 
incentivized to cater to such a significant market sector, the federal public 
procurement guidelines infiltrate the private market as well.197 There are 
over 40,000 products that have earned the Energy Star label in over 60 
different categories.198 In 2009, Americans purchased about 300,000,000 
Energy Star products.199 
1. Consumer Comprehension and Misconception 
Energy Star ecolabels should help consumers determine which 
appliances save energy and money over the product lifetime as compared to 
other models.200 A 2009 survey found that most of the polled consumers 
who were aware of the Energy Star label felt that by purchasing such 
labeled products they were “helping to protect the environment for future 
generations” and “contributing to society.”201 Sixty percent of the polled 
consumers thought the label conveyed “energy efficiency or energy 
savings” and 17 percent thought the label conveyed “environmental 
benefits.”202 The EPA said that these responses showed “high understanding 
of the label.”203 
Of the consumers who recognized the Energy Star label, 25 percent 
associated it with clothes dryers, 11 percent with stoves and ovens, and 4 
percent with microwave ovens, despite that these appliances are incapable 
of receiving the Energy Star label—no specifications exist.204 As previously 
mentioned, an ecolabel may confuse the consumer by representing itself as 
a good option overall, rather than a “less bad” option.205 A comparable 
analogy with ecolabels is that an energy-intensive appliance may receive an 
Energy Star label for being more efficient than comparable products, 
though a nonelectrical alternative is not considered.206 
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Because so many products receive the Energy Star label, the program 
has been criticized for “diluting its impact.”207 In 2010, Consumer Reports 
stated that 75 percent “of TVs, dishwashers and humidifiers qualified for 
Energy Star designation in 2009” even though the program aimed to 
identify the top 25 percent performing appliances.208 They urged the 
government program to award products that are truly the top one-third 
energy efficiency performers in their sector.209 Additionally, Consumer 
Reports believes that the government should be more vigilant and “review 
Energy Star qualification criteria and tests about every three years.”210 
2. How the Ecolabel and Certification Program Suffers from 
Similar Problems of Technology-Based Standards 
Because of the numerous products and categories, the Energy Star 
ecolabel program has been a uniform national standard that is incredibly 
difficult to enforce.211 The enormity of rulemaking procedures, costs, and 
review periods impedes the government’s ability to promulgate revised 
standards in a reasonable time.212 This leads to energy efficiency standards 
that are “extremely out-of-date;”213 meanwhile, the appliance manufacturers 
have little incentive to exceed the Energy Star ecolabel certification 
requirements on their own initiative.214 
A 2010 Consumer Reports study highlighted the disparity in what 
Energy Star standards require compared to actual product performance.215 
More notably, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
conducted an independent investigation and found that the Energy Star 
label was used on “radically inefficient products” and that the certification 
requirements were “easily manipulated.”216 The GAO found that the DOE 
basically trusted the manufacturers to certify their own products and relied 
on the vendors to enforce compliance with energy efficiency standards.217 
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The EPA and DOE realized that they needed to “regain consumer trust 
in the Energy Star label.”218 To help encourage innovation, they created a 
new “Energy Star Most Efficient program,” which recognizes the best 
Energy Star ecolabel products.219 And to increase credibility in the 
certification process, manufacturers pursuing either Energy Star label must 
now have their product certified by an EPA-approved facility.220 
C. LEADERSHIP IN ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (LEED): A 
BUILDINGS LABEL CREATED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL 
The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) administers the most 
prolific green building rating system in the country.221 Buildings that 
receive LEED certification meet criteria that take a “whole-building 
approach to sustainability.”222 Only LEED Certified buildings have the right 
to use the LEED Certification Mark to advertise the building’s 
environmental attributes.223 Their four levels of certification—Platinum, 
Gold, Silver, and Certified—each have a unique ecolabel.224 To earn a level 
of certification, buildings earn points in categories: sustainable sites, water 
efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor 
environmental quality, innovation in design, and regional considerations.225 
The USGBC is a nonprofit organization comprised of industry leaders 
who develop, revise, and administer the LEED green building certification 
program.226 However, federal, state, and local governments have begun to 
encroach on this voluntarily-sought ecolabel program.227 Certain federal 
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agencies now require their public buildings to obtain LEED certification,228 
and state and local governments incentivize private buildings to do so.229 
Cities also are beginning to incorporate LEED green building rating system 
criteria by reference in their local building codes.230 The USGBC estimates 
that “442 localities[,] . . . 35 state governments . . . , [and] 14 federal 
agencies or departments” have implemented LEED-referencing government 
initiatives.231 
Because building codes are typically adopted and enforced by state and 
local governments, the federal government has minimal regulatory 
infrastructure to enforce its own national green building program.232 Some 
critics, nonetheless, call for “[a] comprehensive green building code 
addressing the multi-faceted environmental impacts of buildings.”233 Others 
advocate for the importance of maintaining individual local programs 
because of the inherent issue in adopting a voluntary ecolabel and 
certification program as a national standard.234 Governments and agencies 
rapidly adopt voluntary building certification programs as building 
standards “without fully understanding their benefits, tradeoffs, and 
costs.”235 The building community is uncomfortable with such voluntary 
programs being transformed into required programs.236 
1. Consumer Comprehension and Misconception 
The stakeholders in the building industry have “significant 
misperceptions and misguided expectations” of what the ecolabel 
certification programs represent.237 Some of the confusion may be because 
LEED certification is process-based, rather than product-based.238 Even 
though LEED Certified buildings are designed to exceed energy efficiency 
performance of a typical building, their actual performance may not be any 
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more energy efficient than a nonrated building.239 Additionally, owners are 
able to pick and choose which points to earn, usually by striving for the 
easiest points to obtain.240 Thus, energy performance and indoor air quality 
during the building occupancy could be inconsistent among LEED Certified 
buildings with the same level of points. 
2. How the Ecolabel and Certification Program Suffers from 
Similar Problems of Technology-Based Standards 
The LEED green building rating system program strikes an appropriate 
balance between standards and innovation. Nonetheless, its technology-
based component is criticized for stifling innovation and for inadequate 
administrative capabilities to oversee a national program.241 With the LEED 
green building rating system, all of the measures are assigned the same 
value, regardless of costs or associated benefits.242 The USGBC is also 
known for long delays in certification and backups in applications.243 
Granted, the LEED green building rating system is revised constantly to 
ensure it remains an innovative ecolabel and certification program.244 Yet, 
the constant change is also a downfall to its effectiveness, as industries must 
constantly meet a moving target.245 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION TO PRESERVE ECOLABEL AWARENESS 
Ecolabel programs combine the expedience and enforceability of 
technology-based standards246 with industry innovation and public 
participation.247 Ecolabels raise consumer awareness about environmental 
products, substantiate marketing claims, and encourage innovation by 
stimulating a market for new technology.248 Although ecolabels are not 
without their flaws, federalizing one type of environmental standard that 
addresses all possible product impacts is unlikely to be feasible.249 Many 
ecolabel programs are inherently unsuitable for federal uniform 
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standards.250 Additionally, this note argues that governmentally 
administered ecolabel programs suffer from both consumer 
miscomprehension and command and control consequences. Thus, 
environmental advocates and industries alike should be weary of 
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